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Abstract The classical Shapley value is the averagemarginal contribution of a player,
taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition N when one starts from the
empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have
introduced an allocation scheme for a general coalition formation model where the
evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need not
finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which is only
slightly weaker than the original one but allows a muchmore transparent proof.More-
over, the logical independence of the axioms is exhibited.
Keywords Coalitional game · coalition formation process · Shapley value
JEL Classification C71
1 Introduction
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is among the most popular solution concepts in
cooperative game theory and has been applied numerously. Its basic idea: consider all
possible orders for the players to enter the game and compute each player’s average
marginal contribution over these orders. So the Shapley value can be seen as assuming
particular way of cooperative dynamics: start from the empty coalition and add player
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2after player until the grand coalition is reached. This simple view, however, is quite
restrictive from the point of view of coalition formation. So it is not surprising that
the Shapley value would give counterintuitive results in some situations (see, e.g.,
Roth (1980), Shafer (1980), and Scafuri and Yannelis (1984)).
A much more general framework for a value, suited to coalition formation, has
been developed by Faigle and Grabisch (2012). It takes into account that several play-
ers may enter at any step of the coalition formation process and also that some may
leave the current coalition. Moreover, the process is not assumed to stop when the
grand coalition is formed but may continue to evolve. Indeed, the evolution may be
governed by a Markov chain or any kind of stochastic process. The authors have pre-
sented two values, called Shapley I and Shapley II, which define allocation schemes
for this general situation. While both include the classical Shapley value as a particu-
lar case, a closer study of their properties suggests, however, that Shapley II seems to
be more appropriate in practical settings. Faigle and Grabisch (2012) give an axioma-
tization of Shapley II (see a corrected version in (Faigle and Grabisch, 2013)), with a
very complex proof that is similar to the proof ofWeber (1988) for the axiomatization
of the classical Shapley value.
The aim of this note is to provide a muchmore transparent proof exists for an only
slightly weaker axiomatization. In addition, the logical independence of the axioms
can be demonstrated. To achieve this, we replace the anonymity axiom (invariance of
the value under permutations of the players) by the weaker symmetry axiom (sym-
metric players receive the same payoff) and base our present proof on the decompo-
sition of a game as a sum of unanimity games (as it is done in, e.g., Faigle and Kern
(1992); van den Brink (2001)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes coalition formation pro-
cesses and the allocation scheme (value) we suggest. Section 3 establishes the new
axiomatization. Finally, we prove our axioms’ logical independence in Section 4.
Throughout the paper, N denotes a finite set of n players. We often omit braces
for singletons, writing, e.g., S∪ i, S \ i j instead of S∪{i} and S \ {i, j}. Generally,
we restrict our exposition to a minimum and refer to reader to Faigle and Grabisch
(2012, 2013) for full details and more examples.
2 Values for coalition formation processes
A scenario (of a coalition formation process) is any sequence S = /0,S1,S2, . . . of
coalitions Si ⊆ N that starts with the empty set /0. A scenario need not be finite and
repetitions of coalitions may occur. Also, a scenario need not finish with the grand
coalition. To avoid intricacies, we consider here only finite scenarios /0,S1, . . .Sq.
Example 1 Let N = {1,2,3,4}. Where 12 stands for {1,2}, etc., one possible sce-
nario is
S= /0,12,24,3,123,1234,12 .
Here, players 1 and 2 enter together, then 1 leaves and 4 enters, then both leave and 3
enters, then 1 and 2 enter again, then 4 enters, and finally 3 and 4 leave.
3Example 2 A permutation σ on N induces the following scenario:
/0,{σ(1)},{σ(1),σ(2)}, . . . ,{σ(1), . . . ,σ(n− 1)},N.
The n! permutations of N yield the n! scenarios underlying the classical definition of
the Shapley value.
The idea behind our value is close to Shapley’s original view: compute the marginal
contribution of those players that are active during one transitional step St → St+1
(i.e., those who are entering or leaving the current coalition), and then add these con-
tributions for over all transitions in the scenario. This procedure yields a value for
a given scenario S, which we call a scenario value. We finally consider all possible
scenarios, assuming that the transitions between coalitions are governed by a (time
discrete) stochastic process, typically a Markov chain. Then the (overall) value is de-
rived as the expected value over all possible scenarios of the scenario-values. More
formally, if p(S) is the probability for scenario S to occur in the process U, we obtain
φU(v) = ∑
S←U
p(S)φS(v)
where S← U means “scenario S generated by U” and the scenario-value φS is com-
puted by
φS(v) =
q−1
∑
t=0
φSt→St+1(v) (1)
with S = S1, . . . ,Sq
1. Therefore, it remains to define the scenario-value for a given
transition St → St+1. In the case of the classical Shapley value, where in a transition
only one single player enters and no player leaves, the marginal contribution of the
entering player is naturally defined as
v(St+1)− v(St).
The general situation with possibly several players entering and/or leaving is more
complicated. One first idea leads to what we call the Shapley I value and consists in
using the principle of insufficient reason: divide v(St+1)− v(St) equally among the
active players and thus obtain
φ˜
St→St+1
i (v) =
{
1
|St∆St+1|
(v(St+1)− v(St)), if i ∈ St∆St+1
0, otherwise,
(2)
where St∆St+1 = (St \ St+1)∪ (St+1 \ St) is the set of active players. A more refined
idea turned out to be more fruitful, however, namely the decomposition of a transition
St → St+1 into all possible elementary transitions, i.e., transitions where only one
player can enter or leave at a time. The Shapley II value is the resulting value.
1 We omit here the case of infinite scenarios for brevity. See full details in (Faigle and Grabisch, 2012).
4Example 3 The transition 24→ 3 of the scenario given in Example 1 decomposes
into 6 different ways, depending on the order of the active players 2, 4 and 3:
24→ 4→ /0→ 3
24→ 4→ 34→ 3
24→ 2→ /0→ 3
24→ 2→ 23→ 3
24→ 234→ 34→ 3
24→ 234→ 23→ 3
Since each transition is elementary the marginal contribution is credited to the enter-
ing/leaving player. Formally:
φ
St→St+1
i (v) =


1
|St∆St+1|!
∑
P from St to St+1
(v(S′P)− v(SP)), if i ∈ St∆St+1
0, otherwise,
(3)
where ”P from St to St+1” is any path from St to St+1 in 2
N (as in Example 3) and
SP→ S
′
P
is the unique transition in P such that either {i}= SP\S
′
P
or {i}= S′
P
\SP.
Example 4 (Example 3 ct’d) Computing φ24→3(v), we find
φ24→31 (v) = 0
φ24→32 (v) =
1
6
(
2(v(4)− v(24))+ (0− v(2))+2(v(3)− v(23))+(v(34)− v(234)
)
φ24→33 (v) =
1
6
(
2(v(3)− 0)+ (v(34)− v(4))+(v(23)− v(2))+2(v(234)− v(24)
)
φ24→34 (v) =
1
6
(
(0− v(4))+ 2(v(3)− v(34))+2(v(2)− v(24))+(v(23)− v(234)
)
.
Example 5 (Example 2 ct’d) The application of the Shapley II principle to the n!
scenarios induced by permutations produces exactly the classical Shapley value, as is
easy to check.
3 Axiomatization of the Shapley II value
We briefly recapitulate the six axioms used in (Faigle and Grabisch, 2013) to char-
acterize the Shapley II value. We denote by ψ : G → Rn×S a scenario-value, where
G is the set of games on N, and S is the set of finite sequences of coalitions (not
necessarily starting with /0).
Two sequences S = S1, . . . ,Sq and S
′ = S′1, . . . ,S
′
r are said to be concatenable if
Sq = S
′
1, in which case their concatenation is the sequence
S⊕S′ := S1, . . . ,Sq,S
′
2, . . . ,S
′
r.
The concatenation axiom (C) below allows us to restrict our attention to transitions.
5Concatenation (C): Let S,S′ be two concatenable sequences. Then
ψS⊕S
′
= ψS+ψS
′
.
Indeed, (C) implies for every sequence S= S1,S2, . . . ,Sq,
ψS =
q−1
∑
t=1
ψSt→St+1 .
Inactive players in transitions (IP): If player i ∈ N is inactive in S→ T (i.e.,
if i 6∈ S∆T ), then ψS→Ti (v) = 0 holds for the game v.
Efficiency for transitions (E): For any transition S→ T and game v, we have
∑
i∈N
ψS→Ti (v) = v(T )− v(S).
Linearity for transitions (L): v 7→ ψS→T (v) is a linear map (in v) for any
transition S→ T .
Symmetry for transitions (S’): For any i ∈ N, any transition S→ T and any
permutation σ on N, one has
ψS→Ti (v) = ψ
σ(S)→σ(T)
σ(i)
(v◦σ−1).
Recall that i ∈ N is a null player for v if v(S∪ i) = v(S) for all S⊆ N \ i.
Null players in transitions (N): If i ∈ N is a null player for v, ψS→Ti (v) = 0
holds relative to every transition S→ T .
Two players i, j are said to be antisymmetric if v(K ∪{i, j}) = v(K) is true for every
coalition K ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
Antisymmetry for entering/leaving players (ASEL): If the players i ∈ S\T
and j ∈ T \ S are antisymmetric for v, then ψS→Ti (v) = ψ
S→T
j (v).
Antisymmetric players have, in some sense, a counterbalancing effect: they annihilate
each other when entering together a coalition, which can be interpreted by saying that
they bring the same contribution but of opposite sign. Therefore, if one is leaving and
the other entering, their contribution in the scenario becomes equal and of same sign.
Now, we replace (S’) (symmetry by permutation, a.k.a. anonymity) by the weaker
classical symmetry property as follows. We say that i, j ∈ N are symmetric for v if
v(S∪ i) = v(S∪ j) holds for all S ⊆ N \ i j.
Symmetry axiom (S): For any transition S→ T , any i, j both in S \T or in
T \ S, one has ψS→Ti (v) = ψ j(v)
S→T whenever i, j are symmetric for v.
As pointed out in the Introduction, our proof for the axiomatization relies on
the decomposition of games into unanimity games. Recall that for each nonempty
coalition K ⊆ N, the unanimity game centered at K is defined by
uK(S) =
{
1, if S ⊇ K
0, otherwise.
6It is well known that any game v on N can be written as
v= ∑
/0 6=K⊆N
mv(K)uK
where the coefficients mv(K) (i.e., the coefficients of v in the basis of unanimity
games) yield Mo¨bius transform of v (Rota, 1964). (The coefficients mv(K) are also
known as Harsanyi dividends of v (Harsanyi, 1963).) It follows from the above that
v(S) = ∑
T⊆S
mv(T ) (S⊆ N). (4)
The following lemma characterizes games with antisymmetric players in terms of
the Mo¨bius transform.
Lemma 1 Distinct players i, j are antisymmetric for the game v if and only if
mv(K ∪ i j) =−mv(K ∪ i)−mv(K∪ j), ∀K ⊆ N \ i j,
where mv is the Mo¨bius transform of v.
Proof If i, j are antisymmetric for v andmv is the Mo¨bius transform of v, one deduces
from (4):
0= v(L∪ i j)− v(L) = ∑
K⊆L∪i j
mv(K)− ∑
K⊆L
mv(K)
= ∑
K⊆L
(
mv(K∪ i)+mv(K ∪ j)+mv(K ∪ i j)
)
for any L⊆N \ i j. The choice L= /0 establishesmv(i)+mv( j)+mv(i j) = 0. Now, for
L= {k}, we deduce mv(ik)+mv( jk)+mv(i jk) = 0, etc. until we finally arrive at
mv(K ∪ i)+mv(K ∪ j)+mv(K ∪ i j) = 0.
Theorem 1 A scenario-value satisfies the axioms (C), (L), (IP), (E), (S), (N) and
(ASEL) if and only if it is the Shapley II scenario-value.
Proof The “if part” has already been shown in (Faigle and Grabisch, 2012, 2013). For
the “only if part”, we use the representation of games by unanimity games. By (L)
and (C), it therefore suffices to prove that for any unanimity game uK , any transition
S→ T , the quantities ψS→Ti (uK), i ∈ N, are uniquely determined.
1. Assuming S ⊆ T , consider the unanimity game uK for some K ⊆ N. Observe
that any i ∈ K is a non-null player while any player j ∈ N \K is null. Hence (E), (N)
and (IP), imply
uK(T )− uK(S) = ∑
i∈(T\S)∩K
ψS→Ti (uK).
Assuming |(T \S)∩K|> 1, any two players in this set are symmetric for uK . By (S),
we therefore have
ψS→Ti (uK) =
uK(T )− uK(S)
|(T \ S)∩K|
, i ∈ (T \ S)∩K,
7and ψSi → T (uK) = 0 for any other i by (N) and (IP). Finally, we observe
uK(T )− uK(S) =
{
1, if K ⊆ T and K 6⊆ S
0, otherwise.
In summary, we find
ψS→Ti (uK) =
{
1
|K\S| , if K ⊆ T and i ∈ K \ S
0, otherwise.
2. The case T ⊆ S is analyzed similarly. We find
ψS→Ti (uK) =
{
1
|K\T | , if K ⊆ S and i ∈ K \T
0, otherwise.
3. We consider the case where S \T 6= /0 and T \ S 6= /0 hold. From (N), (IP) and
(E), we deduce
uK(T )− uK(S) = ∑
i∈(S∆T )∩K
ψS→Ti (uK). (5)
Observe that
uK(T )− uK(S) =


1, if K ⊆ T and K 6⊆ S∩T
−1, if K ⊆ S and K 6⊆ S∩T
0, otherwise.
Clearly, if K∩ (S∆T ) = /0, ψS→Ti (uK) = 0 for all i ∈ N by (IP). We assume hereafter
that K ∩ (S∆T ) 6= /0, which excludes K ⊆ S∩ T . The above considerations give us
three cases to distinguish.
3.1. Suppose that K ⊆ T . Then equation (5) becomes
∑
i∈K\S
ψS→Ti (uK) = 1,
and, by (S), (N) and (IP) yields
ψS→Ti (uK) =
{
1
|K\S| , if i ∈ K \ S
0, otherwise.
(6)
3.2. The case K ⊆ S proceeds similarly and establishes
ψS→Ti (uK) =
{
− 1|K\T | , if i ∈ K \T
0, otherwise.
(7)
3.3. Suppose K 6⊆ T and K 6⊆ S. Then equation (5) becomes
∑
i∈(S∆T )∩K
ψS→Ti (uK) = ∑
i∈(S\T )∩K
ψS→Ti (uK)+ ∑
i∈(T\S)∩K
ψS→Ti (uK) = 0.
8All players in (S \T)∩K being symmetric, and similarly for (T \ S)∩K, axiom (S)
guarantees the equality
|(S \T )∩K|ψS→Ti (uK)+ |(T \ S)∩K|ψ
S→T
j (uK) = 0, (8)
for arbitrary players i ∈ S \T and j ∈ T \ S, provided they exist. If (S \T)∩K = /0,
we obtain from (8) for k ∈ K∩T and from (N), (IP) otherwise
ψS→Tk (uK) = 0, ∀k ∈ N. (9)
Similarly, (9) is valid also if (T \ S)∩K = /0. It remains to deal with the case
K1 := (S \T)∩K 6= /0 and K2 := (T \ S)∩K 6= /0.
We argue recursively on |K2|, and start from the singleton K2 = { j}.
Consider the game v := uK − uK\ j. From Lemma 1, we see that all i ∈ K1 are
antisymmetric with j. Applying (ASEL) we find ψS→Ti (v) =ψ
S→T
j (v) for any i∈K1,
which yields by (L):
ψS→Ti (uK)−ψ
S→T
i (uK\ j) = ψ
S→T
j (uK)−ψ
S→T
j (uK\ j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (N)
. (10)
Observe that K′ = K \ j is such that (T \ S)∩K′ = /0. Therefore, either (7) or (9)
applies, and we find
ψS→Ti (uK\ j) =
{
− 1|K\T | , if K \ j ⊆ S
0, otherwise.
This yields
ψS→Ti (uK)−ψ
S→T
j (uK) =
{
− 1|K\T | , if K \ j ⊆ S
0, otherwise.
(11)
Observe that the equations (8) and (11) together yield a unique solution forψS→Ti (uK)
and ψS→Tj (uK).
Assume now that ψS→Ti (uK) is known whenever |K2|= ℓ < |T \S|. We claim that
we can then determine ψS→Ti (uK),ψ
S→T
j (uK) for |K2|= ℓ+ 1.
Choose some j ∈ K2 and consider the game v := uK − uK\ j. Since i and j are
antisymmetric for all i ∈ K1, the same reasoning as above applies, and establishes the
validity of (10). Now, ψS→Ti (uK\ j) is determined by induction hypothesis. Therefore,
ψS→Ti (uK),ψ
S→T
j (uK) are uniquely determined, as claimed.
94 Independence of the axioms
We prove that the seven axioms above are logically independent.
Consider axiom (C). All six remaining axioms determine φS→T (v) for a given
transition S→ T . Hence the value ψS for a scenario S= S1, . . . ,Sq defined by
ψS(v) = f (φS1→S2(v),φS2→S3(v), . . . ,φSq−1→Sq(v)),
where f is an operator different from the sum, satisfies all axioms but (C).
The situation of axiom (L) is similar: our proof of axiomatization of φS→T (v) is
based on the unique determination of φS→T (uK) for any unanimity game uK , using
the five remaining axioms (IP), (E), (S), (N) and (ASEL). Hence the value ψS(v)
defined by
ψS(v) =
q−1
∑
t=1
(
⊕K⊆N m
v(K)φSt→St+1(uK)
)
with v = ∑K⊆Nm
v(K)uK , and ⊕ is an operator different from the sum, satisfies all
axioms but (L).
It remains to show that (IP), (E), (S), (N) and (ASEL) are independent for the
axiomatization of φS→T (uk), for any transition S→ T and any unanimity game uK .
(i) Axiom (E): removing the normalization constant 1|S∆T | in (3) gives a value satis-
fying (IP), (S), (N), (ASEL) but not (E).
(ii) Axiom (IP): consider the value defined by ψS→T = φS→T if 1 ∈ S∆T , and other-
wise
ψS→Ti (v) =


1− δ (v(S,T))
|S∆T |! ∑
P from S to T
(v(S′P)− v(SP)) if i ∈ S∆T
δ (v(S,T ))(v(T )− v(S)) if i= 1
0 otherwise,
where δ (v(S,T )) = v((S∆T )∪1)− v(S∆T ). Clearly, axiom (IP) is not satisfied,
but it can be checked that all other axioms are.
(iii) Axiom (N): consider the value defined by
ψS→Ti (v) =


v(T )− v(S)
|S∆T |
if i ∈ S∆T
0 otherwise.
Then ψS→T satisfies all axioms but (N).
(iv) Axiom (S): define ψS→T (v) as follows: If S ⊆ T , then ψS→T (v) is a weighted
Shapley value instead of a classical Shapley value2, i.e., weights are assigned to
players. Otherwise, ψS→T coincides with φS→T .
Then, unless all weights are equal, this value is not symmetric, although it will
satisfy all other axioms. In particular, (ASEL) is satisfied because (ASEL) in-
volves only transitions S→ T where S 6⊆ T and T 6⊆ S.
2 It is shown in (Faigle and Grabisch, 2013) that φS→T (v) corresponds to the classical Shapley value of
the game vS,T , defined by vS,T (K) = v(K∆S)− v(S) for any K ⊆ S∆T .
10
(v) Axiom (ASEL): let us come back to the proof of Theorem 1. Axiom (ASEL) is
used only in case 3.3 where (S\T )∩K 6= /0 and (T \S)∩K 6= /0. It yields equation
(11), which together with (8) determines the value uniquely. It suffices then to
take any solution of (8) not satisfying (11). For example:
ψS→Ti (uK) =−
|(T \ S)∩K|
|(S \T)∩K|
, ψS→Tj (uK) = 1
for every i ∈ S \T , j ∈ T \ S, and S,T,K satisfy the above condition.
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